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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 59 APRIL 1961 No. 6 
GUIDES TO HARMONIZING SECTION 5 OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT WITH THE 
SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS* 
S. Chesterfield Oppenheimf 
I. THE PROBLEMS PLACED IN CONTEXT 
THIS topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured 
into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act1 in testing the scope of section 5 
itself and its relation to the Commission's jurisdiction under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.2 
My inquiry into these interrelated problems was sparked by 
the challenging observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his 
dissenting opinion in Motion Picture Advertising Service Com-
pany: 
"I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintain-
ing effective competition, as expressed in the Sherman Law, 
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to formu-
late and not altogether harmonious."3 
The Justice also referred to "the legal puzzles these statutes 
raise." He stressed the judicial review obligation of the Court to 
• This article is based on a paper originally delivered before the American Bar Asro-
dation Section of Antitrust Law. It has been revised to include developments since its 
publication in the Report of that Section, 17 A.B.A. ANrrrR.usr SECTION REP. 231 (1960). 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1 The pertinent provision reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." In this 
paper we are not concerned with the Commission's jurisdiction over deceptive acts or 
practices as such. The jurisdictional problems discussed are confined to restraints of trade 
and monopolistic practices of the Sherman Act type, discriminatory practices under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, and the practices covered by §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, and 
their relation to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
2 See also, Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANrrrR.usr BULL. 161 (1960); Rahl, Does Section 5 of 
the FTC Act Extend the Clayton Act1 5 ANnTRusr BULL. 533 (1960). 
8 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953). 
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avoid rubber-stamping the Federal Trade Commission either in 
leaving it "at large" on questions of fact or in determinations of 
law which are ultimately for the courts to decide. "It is also in-
cumbent upon us," he continued, "to seek to rationalize the four 
statutes directed toward a common end and make of them, to the 
extent that what Congress has ·written permits, a harmonious body 
of law." 
In Automatic Canteen/ the same Justice again emphasized the 
Court's "duty to reconcile" interpretations of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act "with broader antitrust policies that have been laid down 
by Congress" when alternative constructions are "fairly open." 
There is no doubt that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observations 
underscore the dilemma frequently faced by antitrust counselors 
in their attempt to solve the "legal puzzles" in the body of antitrust 
laws to which the Justice referred. Antitrust appears to have 
swinging doors. The antitrust counselor may be successful in ab-
solving his client from liability under one antitrust law only to 
find the same client faced in the same situation with the legal 
hazard of violation of another antitrust statute. 
In 1955 the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee Report 
pointed out that: 
"Adherence to the essence of antitrust leaves us not un-
mindful of the risks in oversimplifying the variant statutory 
formulations and their judicial construction. The three 
major statutes-the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, 
and Clayton Acts-have been interpreted and enforced . . . 
with varying degrees of autonomy. And the Sherman Act it-
self has gone through several cycles of judicial construction."5 
Until recently Federal Trade Commission complaints have 
generally segregated and identified offenses arising under each of 
these major antitrust enactments. No jurisdictional problem con-
cerning the appropriate statute is raised in the mass of Commission 
complaints brought under the Clayton Act where the charges are 
particularized and confined solely to Clayton Act offenses indis-
putably within the coverage of that act. Similarly, resort to section 
5 generally raises no jurisdictional issue where the charges readily 
identify conventional Sherman Act offenses clearly within the 
Commission's authority. 
4Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). 
IS REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITI'EE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 2 (1955). 
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In the past few years, however, complaints, Hearing Examiner 
Initial Decisions and Commission rulings have caused concern that 
section 5 is regarded as a congressionally-designed catch-all provi-
sion for conduct embracing hybrid and duplex charges without 
regard to the jurisdictional limits of these several statutes. 
Perplexities of rationalization and harmonization of the poli-
cies expressed in this body of principal antitrust laws come into 
focus in several main categories of jurisdictional questions. Section 
5 has been used to attack practices of the type covered by sections 
2, 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act but not deemed by the Commission 
to be within the purview of that statute. Respondents have con-
tended that this jurisdictional deficiency bars a section 5 proceed-
ing. Likewise, jurisdictional issues are presented when the Com-
mission complaints combine in a single section 5 count, or in 
several counts under section 5 and specified Clayton Act counts, 
charges which appear to disregard or gloss differentiations in juris-
diction, statutory standards and tests of violation. There may also 
be the question whether section 5 is being used as a substitute or 
alternative provision for attacking practices directly covered by the 
Clayton Act. 
These jurisdictional issues are of primary concern in this paper. 
Beyond that, it is also necessary to synthesize the Commission's 
statutory authority in the conventional types of cases since the pur-
pose is to suggest guides for harmonization of the three statutes. 
To what extent can this reconciliation be made within the existing 
framework of these antitrust laws? To what extent is congressional 
amendment required to eliminate what is believed to be at odds 
·with the common goal of maintaining effective competition under 
national antitrust policy? 
!I. STATUTES IN PARI MATERlA AND EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5 
In seeking to rationalize and harmonize the Sherman, Federal 
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
defined this aim, a backdrop of statutory interpretation and judi-
cial interpretations of section 5 is essential to inquiry into congres-
sional intention. 
The fundamental proposition is that statutes related to the 
common end of maintaining effective competition should be con-
strued together as interlaced expressions of national antitrust pol-
icy. This canon of statutory interpretation, known under the des-
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ignation statutes in pari materia, 6 applies where, as here, the 
generality of the standards of the Sherman Act and section 5 must 
be accommodated to the specific provisions of the Clayton Act. 
This process of statutory construction, however, is not "an exer-
cise in logic or dialectic." Canons of construction are axioms of 
experience and not rigid rules of law.7 Construing statutes in pari 
materia requires the Commission and the courts to probe below 
the surface of the statutory words to capture the meaning of the 
public policy of these three statutes fairly within congressional 
intention. Determination of whether there is ambiguity or conflict 
between a general and a specific statutory provision is not a matter 
of abstraction. Statutory words are vessels into which frequently 
many meanings can be poured. Search for congressional intention 
may range from clear mandates to elusive weasel words. If "what 
Congress has written permits" alternative constructions, ambiguity 
or apparent conflict should be resolved in making the three major 
statutes a unified and harmonious national antitrust policy. 
We do not dwell here on the details of the familiar legislative 
history of these statutes.8 The Supreme Court has passed upon 
much of this legislative history in its interpretations. It is indis-
putable that the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts were 
designed to supplement the Sherman Act.9 It is equally clear that 
the particularizations of the Clayton Act have the purpose of 
counteracting the generality of the Sherman Act10 and section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act by bolstering enforcement 
against the specific transactions and practices singled out by Con-
6 See CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES §§ 231, 232 (1940); SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTORY CoNSTRUcnoN §§ 5201-02 (3d ed. 1943). Cf. comment of Judge Learned Hand 
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945): "In 
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 •.• , a later statute in pari materia was con-
sidered to throw a cross light upon the Anti-trust Acts, illuminating enough even to over-
ride an earlier ruling of the court." 
7Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 527, 
529, 544 (1947). 
s For this legislative background, see my UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICFS 624-28 (1950); 
Howrey, supra note 2, at 161-64; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ch. I (1924). 
9FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). 
10 In Motion Picture Advertising, supra note 3, at 405, Justice Frankfurter's dissenting 
opinion recognized this: "The vagueness of the Sherman Law was saved by imparting to 
it the gloss of history •••• Difficulties with this inherent uncertainty in the Sherman Law 
led to particularizations expressed in the Clayton Act .••• The creation of the Federal 
Trade Commission . . • made available a continuous administrative process by which 
fruition of Sherman Law violations could be aborted." 
Note that this merely refers to the Clayton Act as a supplement to the Sherman Act 
and to § 5 as a means of curbing Sherman Act violations. To what extent § 5 supplements 
the Clayton Act is a different question, as the text of this paper infra demonstrates. 
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gress as evils to be curbed under that statute when the specified 
adverse competitive effects are proved. Elementary also is the Su-
preme Court's interpretation that section 5's general phrasing sanc-
tions the Commission's use of that provision as a flexible and ex-
pansive instrument not restricted to common law proscriptions or 
previously adjudicated Sherman Act violations.11 
It cannot be denied that the incipient violation doctrine vests 
in the Commission authority to "nip in the bud" conduct which 
might ripen into the consummated evils at which Congress aimed 
in the Clayton Act. The Commission need prove only a reasonable 
probability12 of the anticompetitive effects under section 2 (a) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act and under sections 3 and 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. 
Confusing dicta of the Supreme Court,13 however, becloud the 
reach of the Commission's zone of power under section 5 to strike 
down incipient violations. When section 5 is used as a supplement 
to attack traditional Sherman Act offenses, it is clear that the Com-
mission may arrest such violations in their incipiency, since the 
Sherman Act as such ordinarily reaches only actually achieved vio-
lations with the exception of proof of a specific intent to monopo-
lize under section 2 of that act.14 But, as other ·writers have prop-
11 ITC v. R. F. Keppel &: Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), changing the restrictive interpre-
tation in ITC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); ITC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 
441 (1922); Fashion Originators' Guild v. ITC, 312 U.S. 457 (1940); ITC v. Cement In-
stitute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); ITC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 
(1953). In the recent opinions of the majority and dissenting Commissioner Tait in Grand 
Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960), there is no disagreement on this particular point. 
12 The Commission has not shown any inclination to take advantage of the "reasonable 
possibility" test as stated in the majority opinion in ITC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 
(1948). 
13 Particularly in this passage from Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Motion 
Picture Advertising (344 U.S. at 395): 
"It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement 
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act - to stop in their incipiency acts and 
practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as 
'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In his dissenting opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts in the disjunctive (at 392): "The Federal Trade Commission Act was 
designed, doubtless, to enable the Commission to nip in the bud practices which, when 
full blown, would violate the Sherman or Clayton A.ct." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In a subsequent part of the text of my paper there is discussion of the extent to 
which § 5 may be considered as a supplement to the Clayton Act. 
H In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948), Justice Reed's 
majority opinion noted that" ••• even though no unreasonable restraint may be achieved, 
nevertheless a finding of specific intent to accomplish such an unreasonable restraint may 
render the actor liable under the Sherman Act. Compare United States v. Griffith, 334 
U.S. 100 •••• " This, of course, may raise baffling questions of the relation of §§ I and 2 
of the Sherman Act. 
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erly pointed out,15 the incipiency violation doctrine is compounded 
if section 5 is used to stop in its incipiency a violation of incipient 
Clayton Act offenses. The competitive effects clause of section 2 (a) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act and of sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton 
Act itself embodies an incipiency test of violation in the words 
"where the effect may be." 
Admittedly a broad grant of authority, section 5 is nevertheless 
not a roving jurisdiction "unconfined and vagrant." Congress 
appears to have "canalized" section 5 "within banks that keep it 
from overflowing" into the area covered by the Clayton Act.16 
III. SECTION 5 CASES INVOLVING ONLY CONVENTIONAL 
SHERMAN AcT OFFENSES 
The contours of the interrelation of section 5 and the Sherman 
Act have been reasonably well defined. The Supreme Court has 
correctly reiterated that the Commission has jurisdiction under 
section 5 to attack incipient or consummated Sherman Act offenses. 
It is therefore pointless to dispute the Commission's resort to sec-
tion 5 with respect to the variety of conventional Sherman Act 
offenses equally familiar in the exercise of the Department of Jus-
tice Sherman Act proceedings. The Commission is also empowered 
to question as Sherman Act offenses conduct not yet adjudicated 
under that act but this may raise borderland novel issues.17 In 
this area, harmonization of the Commission's exercise of section 5 
jurisdiction requires the Commission to be held to the same sub-
stantive criteria as those established by judicial interpretations of 
the Sherman Act. This will require, for example, distinctions be-
tween unreasonable per se restraints and those demanding an ex-
tended Rule of Reason examination.18 Moreover, in the latter types 
15 Howrey, supra note 2; Hodson, Exclusive Dealing, 1954 CCH ANTrmusr LAw 
SYMPOSIUM 140 (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n); Butler, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction 
Under the Incipiency Doctrine, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUsr 
LAws 154 (1953). 
16 The quoted words in this analogy come from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Cardozo in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), where he com-
pares the unlawful delegation of legislative power in the National Industrial Recovery 
Act with the limitations in the power committed to the Federal Trade Commission in § 5. 
17 A leading writer has said that "the Federal Trade Commission Act may be viewed 
not merely as being as basic, but as being even more far-reaching than the Sherman Act." 
He further emphasized that " ..• the general practitioner who advises a client on com-
pliance with the antitrust laws would do well to bracket together the Sherman and Federal 
Trade Commission Acts, and to view their collectively broad commands as a flaming sword 
which turns every way to guard the competitive tree of life of our economy." VAN CISE, 
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTrrn.usr LAws 17, 18 (1958 ed.). 
18 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) and my comment& 
thereon, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUsr SECTION REP. 37-42 (1959). 
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of cases, the Commission should sustain the burden of proving 
substantially adverse effects upon competition in the relevant 
product and geographic market. In all cases in this category, the 
Commission's complaint should identify with reasonable definite-
ness the charges it has reason to believe constitute consummated 
or incipient violations of the Sherman Act. 
Motion Picture Advertising19 exemplifies resort to section 5 as 
a Sherman Act supplement. At issue were contracts for exclusive 
dealing in the display of advertising films. The majority of the 
Court held that the Commission's findings of fact, supported by 
substantial evidence, made it plain "that a device which has sewed 
up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method 
of competition' within the meaning of Section 5 (a) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act." It should be noted that Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Burton, 
does not question this scope of section 5. Rather, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter was concerned ·with the basis and scope of judicial 
review of the Commission's orders as disclosed in the following: 
"My primary concern is that the Commission has not re-
lated its analysis of this industry to the standards of illegality 
in Section 5 with sufficient clarity to enable this Court to re-
view the order." 
"In any event," he said, "the Commission has not found any 
Sherman Law violation." 
IV. COMMISSION CASES INITIATED IN COMPLAINTS 
SOLELY UNDER CLAYTON AcT 
This category, of course, does not raise issues under section 5. 
Here we deal with Commission proceedings where it claims juris-
diction solely under specified provisions of the Clayton Act. This 
area, however, requires evaluation to ascertain the extent to which 
the Commission's approach and Clayton Act interpretations of the 
courts reveal either harmonization within the congressional design 
or dissonances curable only by congressional action. My evaluation 
is here made only in summary form. 
lOFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S .. 392 (1944). The Com-
mission did not resort to § 3 of the Clayton Act since it believed that the contracts did not 
come within the transactions specified in that section. See infra, "Section 5 in Relation to 
Jurisdictional Deficiencies in Section 3 of the Clayton Act." 
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A. Robinson-Patman Act20 
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, pre-
sents some of the most troublesome deviations from a consistent 
over-all antitrust policy. Simplicity Pattern's21 decision and un-
equivocal dicta make plain that sections 2 (c),22 (d) and (e) cannot 
be construed in harmony with the burden of proof requirement of 
substantial injury to competition under section 2 (a). Only Con-
gress can convert these illegal per se violations into a Rule of 
Reason approach.23 If this is not done, the resulting disharmony 
will remain contrary to national antitrust policy. It is contended 
that the illegal per se approach protects against coercion by 
powerful buyers of special or secret rebates. It nevertheless cannot 
be denied that illegal per se violations forestall inquiry into the 
market effects of the discriminatory practices. To that extent, they 
are out of tune with antitrust standards.24 
Interpretations of 2 (a) tend in part toward reconciliation ·with 
antitrust and in part away from it. The Commission has only par-
tially fulfilled its words of promise to require proof of the "sub-
stantiality of effects reasonably probable" in section 2 (a) injury 
to competition proceedings.25 Commission decisions, especially 
those involving buyers' line competition, have reflected only part 
of the Rule of Reason method of inquiry into competitive effects. 
In the automotive parts buyers' line cases,26 the courts of appeals 
20 For fuller discussion, see my analysis in 15 A.B.A. ANTITR.usr SEcnoN REP. 56•69 
(1959). 
21 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). 
22 Cf. the majority and dissenting opinions in the five-to-four Supreme Court decision 
in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960). 
23 Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court in FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), because he was persuaded 
that Congress left no alternative to the per se illegality approach to § 2 (c), (d) and (e) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. But compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the 
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker in FTC v. Henry Broch &: Co., supra note 22. 
24 See perceptive analysis of Corwin Edwards, former Chief Economist of the Federal 
Trade Commission in THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw (1959), where he proposes revisions 
in the Robinson-Patman Act which "would bear little resemblance" to the existing statute. 
25 General Foods Corp., CCH TRADE RF.G. REP. ,r 25,172 (F.T.C. Dkt. 5675) (1954). 
26 This line of decisions is cited in footnote 79 of my paper in 15 A.B.A. REP. 58 
(1959). But compare the majority opinion of Chairman Kintner in Fred Bronner Corp., 
F.T.C. Dkt. 7068 (1960), stating that in the automotive parts cases, relied on by the 
Commission counsel in support of the complaint, "there were additional factors pertinent 
to the price discriminations there involved which are not shown to exist in this case." 
The majority held that, "Under the circumstances, it is our opinion that the evidence of 
record fails to establish that the effect of the price difference here involved may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition between competing purchasers." Commissioners Secrest 
and Anderson agreed with the result and filed concurring opinions. Commissioner Kem 
dissented, stating that the majority holding "constitutes a retreat from the position taken 
by the Commission and sustained by the courts in the automotive parts cases, an act of 
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have generally sustained the Commission's findings of fact based 
on this partial Rule of Reason approach. The Seventh Circuit's 
insistence in Minneapolis-Honeywell,21 that in both sellers' and 
buyers' line cases, the Commission must prove injury to competi-
tion by showing substantial interference with competition has not 
been completely observed by the Commission and the courts of 
appeals in buyers' line 2 (a) cases. In Yale and Towne,28 however, 
the Commission's opinion is a shining example of a genuine Rule 
of Reason analysis of competitive effects in the relevant market on 
the sellers' line. The Commission nevertheless has more frequently 
stressed injury to individual competitors, or a group of competi-
tors, in the buyers' line proceedings. 
In my opinion, these discrepancies are inconsistent with anti-
trust concepts, and are not dictated by the Morton Salt29 rationale 
of the Supreme Court. They can still be corrected in 2 (a) cases 
by the Commission itself without congressional amendment, and 
thus bring 2 (a) into proper relation to over-all antitrust policy. 
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous Anheuser-Busch30 opinion 
repeatedly cautioned that the Court was merely deciding that price 
discrimination in 2 (a) is equated with price differentiations having 
the proscribed anticompetitive effects and not within the 2 (a) and 
2 (b) absolute defenses. Anheuser-Busch, therefore, in no way fore-
closes inquiry into competitive effects on the sellers' line or buyers' 
line by use of a full-scale Rule of Reason probe. 
In the words of the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee 
Report, the Commission's analysis of statutory injury should "cen-
ter on the vigor of competition in the market rather than hardship 
to individual businessmen."31 
B. Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is applicable to exclusive arrange-
ments and tying clauses. When this article was completed, Tampa 
Electric Company82 was pending in the Supreme Court. At that 
retrogression which will adversely affect enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act in a 
most critical and important area." 
27 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. ITC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). 
28 Yale &: Towne Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6232 (1956). 
29ITC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
80ITC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960). 
81 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTI· 
TRUST LAws 164 (1955). 
82Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960), reu'd and 
remanded, 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
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time this writer stated that Standard Stations33 and subsequent 
court decisions34 relied primarily upon quantitative measures in 
determining the anticompetitive impact of exclusive dealing and 
requirement contracts. We further stated that so long as that trend 
continued, it must be considered as falling short of accommoda-
tion to over-all antitrust policy. It was also asserted that nothing 
Congress has written precludes a full Rule of Reason examination 
in section 3 cases based upon a qualitative substantiality test of 
violation.35 
This position is confirmed by the Tamp a Electric seven-to-two 
decision (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting without opinion) 
of the Supreme Court.36 Tampa's rationale illuminates the prac-
tical application of the statutory standards and tests of violation 
of section 3. 
"Following the guidelines of earlier decisions," said Mr. Justice 
Clark, "certain considerations must be taken." What are these 
considerations in any given case? On its facts Tampa involved a 
requirements contract for purchase from Nashville, a Kentucky 
coal company, of all the coal Tampa, a public utility, would re-
quire over a twenty-year period as boiler fuel for a generating 
station Tampa was constructing in Tampa, Florida. Tampa was 
given an option of buying coal from suppliers other than Nash ville 
if it converted other equipment using oil to coal. Tampa was also 
free to purchase up to fifteen percent of its fuel requirements from 
a by-product of a local supplier. After vast expenditures by Tampa 
to install coal burning equipment at the new station, Nash ville 
informed Tampa that the contract was illegal under the antitrust 
laws and would not be performed. Tampa brought suit for a 
declaration that the contract was valid and enforceable. 
The Supreme Court assumed the contract is an exclusive deal-
ing arrangement and that the relevant line of commerce is bitu-
minous coal alone. Decisive in reversal of the judgment below was 
the failure of the lower courts to give "the required effect to a 
controlling factor in the case - the relevant competitive market 
33 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
34 Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952); United States v. Sun Oil 
Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Dictograph and Anchor Serum cases, infra notes 
41 and 42; and Tampa Electric Co., supra note 32. 
35 My version of the quantitative versus the qualitative substantiality test of violation 
is set forth in 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 70-71 (1959). 
36 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The original contract 
was signed with another company but that interest was assigned to Nashville and later 
to West Kentucky Coal Company. 
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area." The Court reversed judgment for Nashville and remanded 
the case to the district court. 
Reviewing its prior section 3 decisions, the Court specifies the 
considerations which must be taken to determine whether it is 
"probable that the performance of the contract will foreclose 
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affect-
ed." First, the relevant product line of commerce must be carved 
out "on the basis of the facts peculiar to the case." Second, the 
area of effective competition must be charted, i.e., the geographic 
market area in which the seller operates and to which the buyer 
"can practicably turn for supplies." Third, "the competition fore-
closed by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial 
share of the relevant market." In weighing the various factors, 
"particularized considerations of the parties' operations are not 
irrelevant." 
In this ,;vriter's view Tampa Electric calms-indeed, should 
remove - the alarm that the Court's previous exclusive dealing 
decisions under section 3, particularly Standard Stations, in effect 
erected a mechanical illegal per se market foreclosure rule. It is 
gratifying - though doubtless surprising to those who interpreted 
Standard Stations to the contrary - that the Court now lays a 
foundation for an extended Rule of Reason examination of the 
competitive effects of exclusive dealing under section 3 in any 
given case.37 If Standard Stations seemed to give too much weight 
to quantitative measures of adverse effects upon competition, the 
Court now expressly states that "a mere showing that the contract 
itself involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little 
consequence" and "the dollar-volume by itself, is not the test." 
The twenty-year period of the contract was "singled out as the 
principal vice," but in the case of a public utility assurance of a 
steady and ample supply of fuel is in the public interest. 
37 Even more surprising is the Court's citation of United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 
ll34 U.S. 495 (1948), which arose under the Sherman Act but, unlike the incipiency test 
of violation under § 3, requires proof of a consummated unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Mr. Justice Clark's listing of the factors which must be weighed under § 3 to determine 
substantiality of foreclosure of competitor is strikingly like those mentioned in United 
States v. Columbia Steel Co., ll34 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). In Tampa, Mr. Justice Clark said 
(at 329): "To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the 
probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into 
account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved 
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable 
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have 
on effective competition therein. It follows that a mere showing that the contract itself 
involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence." 
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Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in Tampa, however, warns against 
assuming that prior section 3 cases before that Court should or 
would have been decided differently. The Justice distinguishes the 
dominant market position of the seller in Standard Fashions,38 the 
myriad substantial sales volume outlets and industry-wide use of 
exclusive contracts in Standard Stations, and restrictive tying ar-
rangements as in International Salt.39 
The crucial issue of the relevant geographic market was a 
question of fact the district court should not have resolved by 
judicial notice on a motion for summary judgment without presen-
tation of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that both courts 
below seemed to have been satisfied with inquiry into competition 
only within "Peninsular Florida." The Court concluded that 
neither that latter area nor the entire state of Florida nor Florida 
and Georgia combined constituted "the relevant market of effec-
tive competition." Rather the appropriate area is bounded by that 
in which the respondents and 700 other companies in the producing 
area effectively compete in marketing their coal of which the over-
whelming tonnage is sold outside Florida and Georgia. Taking 
note of statistical data on this phase, the Court concluded: 
"From these statistics it clearly appears that the propor-
tionate volume of the total relevant coal product as to which 
the challenged contract pre-empted competition, less than 1 % 
is, conservatively speaking, an insubstantial amount. A more 
accurate figure, even assuming pre-emption to the extent of 
the maximum anticipated total requirements, 2,250,000 tons 
a year, would be .77%." 
This minimal pre-emption, the Court concluded, would not 
tend substantially to foreclose competition in the relevant coal 
market. 
Tampa Electric also requires the Federal Trade Commission 
to revise its approach to section 3 cases on exclusive dealing. Be-
fore the Court's decision in Tampa Electric, we noted that in 
Maico40 the Commission professed that, as an administrative tri-
ss Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922). 
39lnternational Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
40 Maico, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953). See also and compare Harley-Davidson Motor 
Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Products Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954); Outboard Marine 
& Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956). ·while he was General Counsel of the Commission, the 
former Chairman Kintner wrote an article espousing the extended Rule of Reason in• 
quiry under § 3. Kintner, Exclusive Dealing, 3 PRACTICAL LAWYER 69 (1957). He stated 
his belief that this method was used in the above-cited cases. The court decisions in 
Dictograph and Anchor Serum, he asserted, did not foreclose the Commission's discretion 
as an administrative tribunal to make an extended market inquiry beyond that in Stand-
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bunal intended by Congress as one equipped to explore all rele-
vant market facts, it is not necessarily bound by the Standard 
Stations strictures. The Commission might have continued to 
regard itself as having the discretion to undertake a broader market 
inquiry were it not for the Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit 
decisions affirming Commission orders in Dictograph41 and Anchor 
Serum42 on the basis of Standard Stations. 
Tampa Electric should create, or restore, as the case may be, 
the Commission's belief that it is not cabined by restrictive quan-
titative measures of adverse competitive effects in weighing the 
factors pertinent to substantiality of foreclosure of competition in 
section 3 exclusive arrangement cases. 
Hereafter the Commission would be wise in giving heed to 
guidelines and considerations specified in Tampa Electric as an 
extended Rule of Reason method of adjudicating section 3 exclu-
sive dealing issues. For the Supreme Court majority has at long 
last made pronouncements apparently intended to bring the in-
cipiency test of violation of section 3 into harmony with over-all 
antitrust policy. 
In tying clause cases, the Commission is confronted with Supreme 
Court constructions which still leave uncertain where to draw the 
ard Stations applicable to Department of Justice cases. See also footnote 13 of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's opinion for the majority in Standard Stations, supra note 33. 
The recent decision of the Commission in Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 
6962 (1960), involving a count charging violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act and two 
counts charging violation of § 5, adopted the Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner 
which included a holding that § 3 was violated. Commissioner Kern's opinion declared 
that since the date of the Commisson's action in Maico, the court of appeals decisions in 
Dictograph and Anchor Serum, infra notes 41 and 42, and in the private suit in Tampa 
Electric, supra note 36, Standard Stations is to be applied by the Commission in § 3 cases. 
It may be that Commissioner Tait's concurrence only in the result indicates he was 
unwilling to join the Commission majority in overruling in practical effect the Commis-
sion's approach in Maico. On the particular record in Mytinger &- Casselberry, it is pos-
sible to infer that the same holding of illegality might have been reached via either the 
Standard Stations or Maico approach. In any event, Mytinger o- Casselberry placed the 
Commission on record as bowing to the commands of Standard Stations. To the same 
effect, see Timken Roller Bearing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6504 (1961), where respondent was 
held in violation of § 3 in a complaint charging violation only of that section. 
The Supreme Court's rationale in Tampa Electric, as analyzed in the text of this 
article, calls upon the Commission to re-assess its approach to § 3 cases. The REPORT OF 
THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Col\lMITI"EE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 148 (1955), 
takes a sound position that identical criteria should govern a § 3 case irrespective of 
whether it initially is tried before a court or the Commission. The Report states (n. 77): 
"Chaotic consequences might attend the anomaly of subjecting identical trade practices to 
different legal principles due to fortuitous circumstances determining whether a District 
Court or the Commission sits as the initial arbiter, in either event subject to appellate 
judicial review." 
<11 Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954). 
42 Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). 
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line between the test of violation applicable to a section 3 Clayton 
Act proceeding and the test applicable to a Sherman Act proceed-
ing.43 The Supreme Court has approved the apparently lesser 
burden under section 3 of proving that a substantial volume of 
interstate commerce in the tied product may be restrained and to 
this the quantitative substantiality test of violation has been ap-
plied. 44 In Northern Pacific45 under section l of the Sherman Act, 
the Supreme Court majority has reduced to virtual per se illegality 
any tying clause where there is proof of sufficient economic power 
over the tying leverage to impose an appreciable restraint over "not 
insubstantial" interstate commerce in the tied article or service.40 
In a proceeding under section 3 of the Clayton Act the Com-
mission would appear to be justified in heeding the Supreme 
Court's warning that, unlike requirements contracts or other ex-
clusive dealing arrangements, "tying agreements serve hardly any 
purpose beyond suppression of competition" and "fare harshly" 
under the antitrust laws. This axiom, expressed in Supreme Court 
opinions, in effect tends to create a presumption of antitrust illegal-
ity, subject to the legally permissible exception of good will pro-
tection by prescribing reasonable specifications for the tied product 
or service.47 
C. Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
Last year this writer evaluated the Commission's rulings and 
some of the Initial Decisions of Hearing Examiners in cases arising 
solely under amended section 7 of the Clayton Act.48 The conclu-
43 Compare the Commission's § 3 tying clause cases in Insto Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363 
(1954) and Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Judson L. 
Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945). 
If a § 5 proceeding should be brought by the Commission in a tying clause case where 
there is lack of jurisdiction under § 3 of the Clayton Act, such as one involving services 
not within the commodities clause of § 3, novel questions would arise. Would the Com-
mission attack the tying clause as an incipient or consummated Sherman Act violation 
governed by the Northern Pacific Sherman Act test, or would the Commission apply the 
Clayton Act test under § 3? Compare approach taken by the Commission in a Robin-
son-Patman Act type of situation in Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960), discussed 
at length infra. 
44 See especially International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) and Times• 
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
45 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See distinctions made 
in dicta in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
46 For fuller discussion, see my paper in 15 A.B.A . .ANrrrRuST SECTION REP. 39-41 (1959). 
47 See limitations indicated in International Business Machines v. United States, 298 
U.S. 131 (1936); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Standard Oil 
of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
48 See 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 69·72 (1959). This, of course, does not imply 
approval of seepage into amended § 7 of the mechanical quantitative test in the manner 
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sion then stated still stands, namely, that the Commission is apply-
ing a full-scale Rule of Reason method of adjudicating amended 
section 7 merger issues. In general, the Commission is applying a 
qualitative rather than mere quantitative substantiality test of vio-
lation, namely, an examination of all relevant market facts and 
factors in determining whether or not there is a reasonable proba-
bility of a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create 
a monopoly in line of commerce in the relevant product and geo-
graphic market. 
This is a proper method of accommodating amended section 7 
of the Clayton Act to the national antitrust policy expressed by 
Congress in that act and as a supplement to the Sherman Act. 
V. SECTION 5 CASES INVOLVING JURISDICTIONAL DEFICIENCIES 
UNDER THE CLAYTON AcT AND COMBINED SECTION 5 AND 
CLAYTON AcT CHARGES 
A. Preliminary Observations 
This is the category which brings into sharp focus "the legal 
puzzles" presented by the interrelations of section 5 and the Clay-
ton Act. 
In this borderland, jurisdictional deficiencies under the Clayton 
Act may be found in the Robinson-Patman Act, or in section 3 or 
section 7. In Commission complaints combining section 5 and 
Clayton Act charges, the issues may become more complicated 
because they may concern not only jurisdictional deficiencies but 
also failure to segregate section 5 charges from those under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, and claims of jurisdiction under section 
5 over practices within Clayton Act coverage. 
We do not underrate the tortuous path the Commission and 
the courts must travel in any attempt to bring the Sherman, Fed-
eral Trade Commission and Clayton Acts into a concordant whole 
compatible with congressional intention. Before analyzing partic-
ular cases, we first suggest some general principles for a synthesis 
of the statutory pattern in this category of cases. 
While alternative constructions may be gleaned from congres-
sional legislative history, it seems that, on balance, the Commission 
has authority under section 5 to proceed against equivalent types 
of practices not within the jurisdictional bounds of the coverage 
specified in the Clayton Act. 
it was applied under old § 7 in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in United 
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours&: Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
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This was the position taken by the Attorney General's Antitrust 
Committee.49 Its Report recognized that the Commission is legiti-
mately entitled to challenge under section 5 conduct economically 
equivalent to the anticompetitive practices in Clayton Act provi-
sions but not reachable thereunder due to lack of technical pre-
requisites. In accord is the Commission's pronouncement in its 
interlocutory ruling in Foremost Dairies that ". . . practices not 
technically within the scope of a specific section of the Clayton Act 
may nevertheless constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act."50 
In this connection, certain qualifications must be kept in mind. 
Section 5 should impose upon the Commission the same burden of 
proof as the particular Clayton Act provision covering the "eco-
nomically equivalent" anticompetitive transaction or practice. 
Furthermore, as the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee 
Report adds, section 5 should not be invoked as a substitute for 
attacking a transaction or practice which is covered by the Clayton 
Act. 
Still another caveat should be noted. In Foremost Dairies, 
supra, the Commission's interlocutory ruling further stated that 
"facts indicating a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as 
amended, may also indicate a violation of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act." 
This does not warrant the Commission's use of pleadings in its 
complaints which, by use of a single section 5 count,51 or plural 
49 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws 148-149 (1959). 
50 Foremost Dairies, Inc., 52 F.T .C. 1480 (1956). 
51 At the time this article was first published, we stated that the single blunderbuss 
§ 5 count in the sales commission TBA complaints reveals great lack of clarity in these 
respects. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. & Texas Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6485 (1956); Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. & Atlantic Refining Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6486 (1956); Firestone Tire &: 
Rubber Co.&: Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6487 (1956). On March 9, 1961, the Commission 
(four members participating and the opinion of the Commission written by Chairman 
Kintner) found that § 5 was violated and entered cease-and-desist orders in the Goodyear-
Atlantic and Firestone-Shell cases. The Goodrich-Texas proceeding, however, was re-
manded to the Hearing Examiner for reception of further evidence concerning the com-
petitive effects of the respondents' practices. 
All three cases involve the legality of contracts between the respective tire and oil 
companies calling for payment of a sales commission to the oil company in return for 
assistance in promoting sales of the tire company's automotive tires, batteries and acces-
sories (known as TBA products) to the retail and wholesale outlets of the oil company. 
We do not purport here to go into the merits of these cases. Viewing them simply 
from the standpoint of the jurisdictional scope of § 5 in relation to the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, we still believe that at their inception the Commission's complaints failed 
to identify with reasonable definiteness the charges therein. At that time, the respondents 
were entitled to know whether the "unfair methods of competition" or "the unfair acts 
and practices" within the reach of § 5 comprehended only charges of Sherman Act types 
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counts combining in one complaint section 5 and other sections 
of the Clayton Act, do not identify with reasonable definiteness 
charges related to the particular statutory provision. Otherwise 
the Commission would be claiming jurisdiction over composite or 
hybrid offenses in pleadings that would not enable a respondent 
to contest the issue whether the Commission is staying within the 
metes and bounds of each statute and its supplementation as al-
lowed by congressional intent. 
Most important of all, this attempted accommodation of the 
several statutes in this antitrust pattern should not be viewed as an 
invitation to invoke section 5 whenever the Commission believes 
that the conduct "runs counter" to or is contrary to "the spirit" of 
any one of these statutes.152 Such vague grasping for jurisdiction 
would be a misconceived and uncontrolled administrative discretion 
of the Commission neither intended by Congress nor supportable 
of violation, or whether the charges were also aimed at conduct within §§ 2 and 3 of 
the Clayton Act, or economically equivalent thereto but technically lacking in jurisdic-
tional requisites for Clayton Act coverage. 
A fair reading of the complaints as of the time of their issuance reveal that they 
allowed for a hybrid of Sherman, Robinson-Patman and Clayton Act § 3 charges in a 
breadth of allegations and generality of language that left at large the possible defenses 
respondents might have to meet. Such clarification regarding the theory and scope of 
the complaints as may have resulted from the hearings, or at the time of the Initial 
Decision of the Hearing Examiner, or now in the Commission's findings, conclusions and 
opinion, is beside the point. As a matter of fairness, the complaint itself should perform 
the minimal function of informing a respondent with reasonable specificity of the charges 
and their relation to § 5 as distinct from the Clayton Act. Otherwise respondent's counsel, 
as of the time of the complaint, is not in a position to know whether the Commission is 
seeking to substitute § 5 in challenging conduct covered by the Clayton Act or is claiming 
jurisdiction under § 5 over conduct not technically covered under the Clayton Act but 
equivalent in economic nature and effect. 
This latter hazard is now illustrated by the inclusion in the Commission's orders in 
the Goodyear-Atlantic and Firestone-Shell cases of paragraphs which on their face are 
in significant part in the tenor of the Commission's orders in brokerage cases under § 2 (c) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The complaints in these TBA cases did not give reasonable 
notice of this phase nor did the Commission's opinion discuss violation from this stand-
point. It was merely mentioned in passing in the appeal brief at p. 97 of counsel sup-
porting the complaint. Admittedly, the Commission's order, as indicated in note 100 
infra, may include any injunctive provision reasonably related to prevention or correction 
of the violation found to exist. This does not, however, absolve the Commission from a 
failure to make an order responsive to what the complaint and the record evidence as a 
whole warrant, both in giving respondents notice of what they must be prepared to 
meet, and in not leaving a reviewing court in the dark as to relation of the remedy to the 
substantive violation. Othenvise an excessively broad order may ban lawful conduct 
which is separable from that found to be unlawful. 
Also beside the point, so far as the notice-giving function of the initial complaint 
pleadings is concerned, would be the hindsight view that respondents are now apprised 
by the detailed analysis in the Commission's opinion that the contracts are illegal under 
§ 5 as basically a Sherman Act type of violation stemming from substantial anticompetitive 
effects at the manufacturing, wholesale and retail levels. 
152 See extended discussion infra of Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960). 
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on judicial review.53 Motion Picture Advertising,54 it should be re-
membered, sustained the Commission's section 5 order in a case 
involving the equivalent of an exclusive dealing practice covered 
by section 3 of the Clayton Act. The Shell Oil, Socony Mobil and 
Ice Cream cases,55 discussed later in this paper, were also brought 
under section 5 on charges of equivalence to exclusive dealing 
within section 3. Grand Union, also discussed below, was a section 
5 case attacking a discriminatory practice equivalent to that cov-
ered in 2 ( d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. These are far removed 
from nebulous charges of practices "contrary to the antitrust laws" 
or in violation of "the spirit" of the Clayton Act. 
In the discharge of their task of judicial review of the Com-
mission's orders, the courts are the ultimate safeguards in assessing 
the record in any given case to determine whether there is substan-
tial evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact and in 
deciding what, as a matter of law, is encompassed within section 5 
or the Sherman and Clayton Acts.56 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dis-
senting opinion in Motion Picture Advertising is a constructive 
essay on these aspects of administrative law applicable to the Com-
mission.57 It provides a guiding frame of reference for many of the 
issues here discussed. 
53 Note the interesting analogies found in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and 
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), discussing the differences between the unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power under the Codes of Fair Competition plan of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act and the limitations on the powers of the Federal Trade Commission under 
§ 5. The opinions emphasize the difference between prohibiting unfair methods of com• 
petition and the affirmative power to regulate fair and lawful methods of competition. 
MFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1944). 
55 Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7044 (1959); Socony Mobil Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6915 
(1960); Carnation Co., F.T.C. Dkts. 6172-6179 and 6425 (1959); and see infra for further 
references to these proceedings. 
156 As flexible and expansible as § 5 may be within the interpretations of the Supreme 
Court, the landmark opinion of then Mr. Justice Stone in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 
U.S. 304 (1934), warned it was not intimated that "the Commission may prohibit every 
unethical competitive practice regardless of its character or consequence." In Motion 
Picture Advertising the Court differed on the assessment of the record but FTC v. Gratz, 
253 U.S. 421 (1920), still stands for the proposition that it is for the courts, and not the 
Commission, ultimately to determine, as a matter of law, what § 5 includes. 
In the following illustrative cases the Commission has also issued complaints under 
§ 5 alleging knowing inducement or receipt of payments or allowances similar to the 
allegations in Grand Union: Foster Publishing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7698 (1959); J. Wein• 
garten, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7714 (1960); American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 
F.T.C. Dkt. 7835 (1960); Benner Tea Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7866 (1960); Individualized 
Catalogues, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7971 (1960); ADT Catalogs, F.T.C. Dkt. 8100 (1960). Cf. 
R.H. Macy&: Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7869 (1960), containing novel allegations under § 5 of use 
of the leverage of purchasing power to induce contributions from suppliers in connection 
with the centennial celebration of Macy in New York. 
57 Among his points are these: determination of the scope of § 5 is a matter of law 
to be defined by the courts; this "was not entrusted to the Commission for ad hoc 
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Even when the Commission stays within the bounds of its 
authority, decisions in conflict with over-all antitrust policy may be 
attributable in some instances to the Congress, as we have previous-
ly shown in the effect of the Supreme Court's interpretations of 
congressional intention in Simplicity Pattern58 with respect to 2 (c), 
(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and in the subsequent 
Broch59 interpretation of 2 (c) by the majority of the Court. If 
Congress is dissatisfied with the Court's reading of its intention, the 
responsibility for correction of resulting deviations from desired 
national antitrust policy rests with that legislative body. 
We now turn to an analysis of the recent utilization of section 
5 by the Commission in this category of cases, considering the juris-
dictional deficiencies in the Robinson-Patman Act and sections 3 
and 7 of the Clayton Act in the order named. 
B. Jurisdictional Deficiencies for Robinson-Patman Act 
Proceeding 
The recent four-to-one decision of the Commission in Grand 
Union°0 squarely joins the issue whether the Commission can re-
sort to section 5 where a discriminatory practice does not come 
within the Robinson-Patman Act because of a technical jurisdic-
tional omission in that statute. 
The complaint alleged and the Hearing Examiner found 
knowing inducement or receipt by respondent of promotional al-
lowances not made available by the respondent's suppliers on pro-
portionally equal terms to the respondent's competitors. 
This, in effect, amounts to knowing inducement of a violation 
of section 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The complaint ap-
pears to be drawn on the theory that buyer liability under section 
2 (£) of the Robinson-Patman Act applies only to a direct or indi-
rect price discrimination under section 2 (a), and therefore does 
not embrace a 2 (d) promotional allowance or a 2 (e) services or 
determination within the interstices of individualized records but was left for ascertain-
ment by this Court"; otherwise "the curb on the Comim$ion's power . • • would be 
relaxed, and unbridled intervention into business practices encouraged"; " • • • he is no 
friend of administrative law who thinks that the Commission should be left at large." 
r,s FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). 
1511 FTC v. Henry Broch 8: Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960). 
60 Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960). Accord: American News Co., F.T.C. 
Dkt. 7396 (1961). In a similar case pending on appeal before the Commission, the Initial 
Decision of the Hearing Examiner held there was a violation of § 5. Giant Food Shopping 
Center, Inc., F.T.C, Dkt. 6459 (1960). See also consent settlement order in a much 
earlier § 5 case in United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6525 (1956). 
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facilities violation. Section 5 was therefore used to bridge a gap 
in jurisdiction the Commission believed to exist even though the 
Commission's statutory interpretation of 2 (f) as not covering 2 (d) 
or 2 (e) was left open in Automatic Canteen.61 
The majority opinion of Commissioner Secrest might have 
been narrowed to precisely what was the issue on the particular 
record of the case if it had been confined to the following ground: 
"In the absence of evidence of Congressional intent not to 
render unlawful practices related to those specifically prohib-
ited by the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no substance to 
respondent's argument that the Federal Trade Commission 
Act cannot be extended to proscribe discriminatory practices 
which do not come within the purview of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. The rule of statutory construction is that general 
and specific statutes should be read together and harmonized, 
if possible, and that the specific statute will prevail over the 
general only to the extent that there is conflict between them. 
There is no dispute as to whether the specific provisions of the 
Robinson-Patman Act are controlling insofar as they specifi-
cally prohibit certain practices. There is nothing in the Act 
itself, however, which conflicts with the Commission's broad 
authority under Section 5 to define and proceed against prac-
tices which it deems to be unfair, including those which may 
come within the periphery of the later Act, although not 
within its letter." 
The majority, however, was not content with this statutory 
interpretation which, in my opinion, would in itself have been a 
rational reading of congressional intention for harmonizing section 
5 and the jurisdictional defect in 2 (f) as applied to 2 (d). Instead 
the majority used the occasion for arriving at a sustainable result 
on the facts of the case by announcing a rationale with a much 
deeper potential thrust. 
61 In footnote 14 of the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Automatic Can-
teen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1952), the Court said regarding its interpretation 
of the ambiguous language of § 2 (f): "We of course do not, in so reading 2 (f), purport 
to pass on the question whether a 'discrimination in price' includes the prohibitions in 
such other sections of the Act as §§ 2 (d) and 2 (e)." 
It might be argued that in cases like Grand Union the Commission should have tested 
this issue by an administrative interpretation that § 2 (f) includes 2 (d) and 2 (e). We 
believe that where alternative constructions are fairly open (cf. Automatic Canteen, supra), 
the Commission has discretion to interpret 2 (f) as limited to price discrimination under 
2 (a). In any event, the proper interpretation of congressional intention is ultimately for 
the Supreme Court to decide and Grand Union itself would offer an occasion for such a 
test case. 
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The majority opinion reviews the legislative history of the 
Robinson-Patman Act to demonstrate that one primary evil Con-
gress sought to curb was the use of mass purchasing power of large 
buyers to induce discriminatory promotional concessions from sup-
pliers. Commissioner Secrest then concluded: 
"We think that the most that can be said on this point from 
the legislative history and from a reading of the Act itself is 
that the practice charged in the complaint is not specifically 
prohibited by the Act. Certainly it cannot be inferred from 
this fact that Congress countenanced a practice which so 
clearly violates the spirit of the statute. 
" ... it is our opinion that it is the duty of the Commission 
to 'supplement and bolster' Section 2 of the amended Clayton 
Act by prohibiting under Section 5 practices which violate 
the spirit of the amended Act." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The words "the spirit of the statute" in part caused dissenting 
Commissioner Tait to say that he was "fearful of the implications 
of what it [the majority opinion] says." This is understandable 
and a timely warning that may prove to be prophetic if, in future 
section 5 cases, the Commission majority chases spirits instead of 
dealing with substance in supplementing the Robinson-Patman 
Act where the alleged omissions are not so clearly the flesh and 
blood of a Robinson-Patman type of violation as in Grand Union.62 
The issue in Grand Union on its particular record could have 
been resolved without ambiguous and disturbing language in the 
majority opinion if it had been limited to the ground that con-
gressional omission of 2 (d) coverage in 2 (f) was inadvertent rather 
62 Commissioner Tait, however, fears that "thousands of businessmen must first de-
termine if the business practice is legal under the Robinson-Patman Act. Then they must 
also determine whether the practice is legal under a vague standard, herein stated to be 
'the spirit of the amended Act.' I am in vigorous disagreement with an approach to the 
law which has too much sail and too little anchor, or too much supplement and too little 
bolster.'' 
This fear would be justified if, unlike the particular facts of Grand Union, the prac-
tice is not the equivalent of the type prohibited by the Clayton Act. As stated infra in 
the principles suggested for this category of cases, absent this economically equivalent 
practice, businessmen would not be able to equate the business practice with the Robinson-
Patman Act type of prohibition. If the Commission, in future cases under § 5, should 
fail to observe the limitations on § 5 jurisdiction, the reasonable definiteness in the 
complaint pleadings, and the proof requirements, all applicable to a § 5 proceeding based 
on a jurisdictional defect in omission of a prohibition equivalent to those in the Clayton 
Act, Commissioner Tait's apprehension will prove to be well founded. Certainly Congress 
did not intend, as Commissioner Tait contends, that "Any alleged gaps which may appear 
in the Clayton Act provisions . . • will not require legislation; the Commission merely 
has to declare them contrary to the spirit of the Clayton Act.'' 
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than deliberate, in other words, a casus omissus.68 This was articu-
lated in the opinion of Hearing Examiner Lewis accompanying his 
Initial Decision which the majority adopted. The majority noted 
this as a plausible argument advanced by counsel in support of the 
complaint, citing the late Charles Wesley Dunn, who took part in 
drafting the section. 64 
In that context Grand Union does not stray from the orbit of 
the guides suggested below in this paper for reconciling section 5 
and jurisdictional defects in the Robinson-Patman Act. It is argu-
able, of course, that what Congress has omitted even by inadvert-
ence in one statute cannot be supplied in another statute, even 
when they are construed together as covering the same kind of 
subject matter. On this point, the Grand Union majority view of 
the Commission is preferable. No conflict between section 5 and 
2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act results from the majority deci-
sion. Business counsel should have no difficulty equating the 
Grand Union practice with that covered in 2 (d). 
With respect to the burden of proof of knowing inducement 
and receipt of discriminatory promotional allowances, the majority 
opinion in Grand Union holds that the Hearing Examiner's find-
ings were supported by substantial evidence. Automatic Canteen's 
"rule of convenience" for apportioning the burden or producing 
evidence on this issue of the buyer's knowledge was applied.611 
Similarly, on other aspects, the Grand Union majority opinion is 
68 On the principles of statutory interpretation relevant to omissions in a statute, see 
CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 169 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUC· 
TION § 4924 (3d ed. 1943). 
64 Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), 1946 CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 55 (N.Y. 
State Bar Ass'n). 
65 In his Initial Decision opinion, Hearing Examiner Lewis applied the Automatic 
Canteen principles regarding the burden of proof, saying: 
"While there may be some question as to whether the Court's holding in that case 
with respect to the Government's burden of going forward with the evidence should be 
applied here in view of the manifest difference between expecting a buyer to know his 
seller's costs and expecting him to know whether his seller has made similar payments 
available to other buyers, the hearing examiner will nevertheless regard the rule in that 
case as being applicable here." 
But in Food Fair Stores, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6458 (1957), in denying the respondent's 
motion to dismiss, Hearing Examiner Hier ruled that Automatic Canteen was not appli-
cable to cases involving buyer inducement or receipt of discriminatory allowances. Balance 
of convenience, he stated, was not pertinent when, as contrasted with cost justification 
issues, a simple inquiry by the buyer addressed to his supplier, or, if necessary, a subpoena 
duces tecum, would disclose from the supplier's records the essential information regarding 
allowances. Even if this difference is conceded, it overlooks the risk entailed of impairment 
of competition and of arm's-length bargaining. Hearing Examiner Lewis' position on this 
point, followed by the majority in Grand Union, is more consistent with adaptation of 
Automatic Canteen to national antitrust policy. 
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in the tenor of and cites precedents under the Robinson-Patman 
Act. 
Commissioner Tait's dissenting opinion also expresses concern 
that the majority decision makes per se illegal under section 5 a 
buyer's knowing inducement or receipt of allowances not pro-
scribed by 2 ( d). This, he said, "legislates a new antitrust prohibi-
tion" and "is beyond the authority of the Commission." 
The majority opinion, however, as applied in the Grand Union 
record does not appear to open the door to an overall per se viola-
tion approach to section 5. There is nothing in the majority opin-
ion that implies a backing away from the Commission's burden of 
proving substantial injury to competition, as exemplified in the 
Shell and Socony Mobil cases discussed in another part of this 
paper.66 
Having construed 2 (£) as not applicable to 2 (d), and having 
further decided there is no conflict in statutory policies in equating 
the Grand Union practice under section 5 with 2 (d), the Commis-
sion majority chose to apply the per se violation doctrine as the 
alternative best designed to harmonize the two statutes, instead of 
creating a conflict by requiring proof of substantial adverse effects 
on competition. Here again this should come as no surprise to 
business counsel inured to the per se violation approach applied 
not only to 2 (d) but to 2 (c) and (e) as well, as the Supreme Court 
has declared to be in accord with congressional intention. 
This writer has inveighed against enlargement of the per se vio-
lation approach under the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman 
Act67 and would be among the first to protest its expansion under 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In Grand Union, 
however, the Commission could hardly be expected to ignore Su-
preme Court rulings when its section 5 jurisdiction, so far as the 
facts of Grand Union are concerned, is based on an identical twin 
of a 2 (d) species the Commission believed to be omitted from 2 (£). 
As stated earlier in this paper, congressional amendment is needed 
if this per se approach is to be converted into a Rule of Reason 
inquiry into the competitive effects of 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e) Robin-
son-Patman Act practices. 
66 See also § 5 proceedings in Roux Distributing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6636 (1959) and 
Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6677 (1959) and my comments thereon, 15 
A.B.A. ANlTI'RUST SECTION REP. 47-49 (1959). 
67 Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Anti-
trust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1952). 
844 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
It nevertheless behooves the Commission to be mindful of the 
reservations expressed by dissenting Commissioner Tait.68 Apart 
from the question of their relevance to Grand Union, Commis-
sioner Tait's dissenting opinion serves notice on his colleagues 
that the Commission's own sense of self-restraint may become an 
68 One issue of paramount importance still needs clarification by the Supreme Court. 
As shown in the quoted passage from Motion Picture Advertising, supra note 13, Supreme 
Court dicta state that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and 
bolster the Sherman and Clayton Acts, including the application of the incipiency viola-
tion doctrine to both statutes. This is an ambiguous statement and may portend an 
unwarranted scope of § 5 beyond congressional intention. 
As shown in this and other parts of this paper, my position is that § 5 clearly supple-
ments the Sherman Act. It also supplements the Clayton Act but only when § 5 is used 
to reach transactions and practices economically equivalent to those particularized by the 
Clayton Act but not within its coverage because of a jurisdictional deficiency. Section 5, 
however, does not supplement the Clayton Act when the practices arc within the coverage 
of the Clayton Act. Resort to § 5 in such instances would constitute a substitution of § 5 
for the statutory standards and tests of violation Congress prescribed and specified in the 
Clayton Act. Thus, the Clayton Act supplements § 5 but the broad proposition that ~ 5 
supplements the Clayton Act is in conflict with congressional intention. 
Construing the three statutes in pari materia requires that they be harmonized as a 
body of antitrust laws directed toward the maintenance of effective competition. It does 
not follow, however, that Congress was indifferent to the differentiation in jurisdiction, 
statutory standards and tests of violation in the several statutes. 
The hard fact is that in 1914 Congress enacted two statutes. The Federal Trade 
Commission Act became law on September 26, 1914 and the Clayton Act took effect on 
October 15, 1914. Legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended the 
Commission to proceed solely under the Clayton Act against transactions and practices 
specifically covered thereby. At one critical stage, the Senate amended the proposed 
Clayton Act by striking out the sections on price discrimination and exclusive dealing 
and tying clauses on the theory they were already covered under § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 51 CoNG. REc. 13849 (1914). Had these excisions been made, § 5 would 
have been broad enough to cover the specified practices. The Conference Committee, how-
ever, restored the specific Clayton Act provisions which later were enacted as §§ 2 and 3 
of the Clayton Act of 1914. See S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) on H.R. 15657 
and 51 CoNG. REc. 15828-29, 16147, 16154, 16264, 16273 (1914). 
Similar specifications were made with respect to the merger transactions in the 1914 
§ 7 of the Clayton Act and in the 1950 amendment thereto. Another parallel is found in 
the additional specifications of the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amending § 2 of the 1914 
Clayton Act. The legislative history of original § 7 [see HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, ch. I (1924)], and amended § 7 [see my FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, chs. 10 
and 11 (2d ed. 1959)] and of the Robinson-Patman Act [see Rowe, Evolution of the 
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty Year Perspective, 57 CoL. L. REv. 1059 (1957)], substan-
tiate that § 5 was not intended to be used as an alternate to reach what is specifically 
within the coverage of those Clayton Act provisions. 
When these statutes are construed in pari materia in the light of the foregoing 
legislative history, the dicta of Motion Picture Advertising do not support the generaliza-
tion that § 5 supplements the Clayton Act. Only when there is an omission from the 
Clayton Act of economically-equivalent transactions or practices is it proper to say that 
§ 5 supplements the Clayton Act without creating a conflict between them. 
The reader can trace the origin and repetition of the confusing dicta in Motion Pic-
ture Advertising in the following cases: FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Fashion 
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 
345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
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important safety valve against propensity for excessive claims of 
section 5 jurisdiction.69 
C. Section 5 in Relation to Jurisdictional Deficiencies 
in Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
In several recent section 5 cases,70 the complaints alleged prac-
tices that in the aggregate or severally went beyond the transactions 
of lease, sale, or contract for sale specified in section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act. In the Shell Oil and Socony Mobil Oil car dealer cases, 
the respondents were charged with furnishing lubrication equip-
ment on loan as well as on lease or sale. Beyond section 3's trans-
actions were also charges of making gifts of cash, equipment or 
facilities and of furnishing customer benefits such as construction, 
painting and paving. All of these were charged to be on condition 
that the recipient would handle the oil company's lubrication oil 
and greases preferentially. 
In the Ice Cream cases the section 5 complaints also included 
transactions beyond section 3's ambit in coverage of transactions 
or practices. Furnishing of equipment without sale or lease, finan-
Ofl In another class of cases the Commission has issued complaints with separate counts 
alleging violation of § 5 and specified sections of the Robinson-Patman Act. The sug-
gested guides for these cases are summarized in the text of this article, infra. The illus-
trative cases cited below classify as follows: 
(I) Section 5 and Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Grove Laboratories, 
Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6743 (1957) (consent settlement); Oxford Filing Supply Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 
(1958) (consent settlement); Maguire Industries, F.T.C. Dkt. 7090 (1958) (consent settle-
ment); Sun Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6641 (1959) (final order and opinion of Commission) 
pending on appeal in the Fifth Circuit; Texas Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6898 (1959); Southwestern 
Sugar &: Molasses Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7463 (1959); Dayton Rubber Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7604 
(1960); Northeast Capital Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 7727 (1960) (consent settlement); Lloyd A. 
Fry Roofing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7908 (1960); Celotex Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 7907 (1960); Logan-
Long Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7906 (1960). 
(2) Section 5 and Section 2(d) or 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Knomark Mfg. 
Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6264 (1955) (consent settlement); Dolcin Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6569 (1956) 
(consent settlement); Trifari, Krussman &: Fischel, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7119 (1958) (consent 
settlement); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7117 (1958) (consent settlement); 
Keystone Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7118 (1958) (consent settlement); Marlun Mfg. Co., F.T.C. 
Dkt. 7516 (1959); Nibco, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 8074 (1960). 
In Fred Meyer, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7492 (1959), the complaint alleges in Count I viola-
tion of § 2 (f) (knowing inducement of discriminatory prices) and in Count II violation 
of § 5 (knowing inducement of discriminatory allowances). 
70 Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7044 (1959); Socony Mobil Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6915 
(1960); Carnation Co., F.T.C. Dkts. 6172-6179 and 6425 (1959). 
In Motion Picture Advertising Service, supra note 3, the jurisdictional shortcoming 
arose from the nature of the contracts. The court of appeals ruled they were agency 
relationships and hence not within § 3, citing Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923). Justice Douglas held that Curtis was not relevant because 
§ 3 was not involved. In its Brief at p. 25 the Commission confessed doubts whether the 
transaction was a sale or lease of the advertising films and hence resorted to § 5. 
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cial assistance in money loans, performing or furnishing various 
type of services, and the granting of various discounts, rebates and 
allowances were alleged. Some of these practices may be within 
the Robinson-Patman Act but all were alleged in the amended 
section 5 complaints to be expressly or impliedly conditioned on 
exclusive dealing.71 
Strictly from the standpoint of jurisdiction, it must be con-
ceded that in the Shell and Socony Mobil cases, where the 
Initial Decisions of the Hearing Examiner dismissing the com-
plaints were adopted by the Commission, and in the Ice Cream 
cases where the Commission recently remanded them to the Hear-
ing Examiner, jurisdiction under section 5 was based on the theory 
that it encompasses practices of the type prohibited by, but not 
technically within, section 3. In all three cases the practices were 
considered on the theory that the complaints under section 5 at-
tacked exclusive or preferential dealing parallel or comparable to 
practices within section 3 of the Clayton Act.72 
The Commission's affirmance of the dismissal of the complaints 
in Shell and Socony Mobil approves the extended Rule of Reason 
inquiry the Hearing Examiner in each of those cases made in re-
solving the issues. In both cases the dismissals were based on failure 
of counsel supporting the complaint to produce reliable, probative 
and substantial evidence of reasonable probability of substantial 
injury to competition resulting from the alleged exclusive 
arrangement.73 This has the merit of applying to a section 5 pro-
71 The original complaints charged respondents with illegal practices only when used 
in connection with "switch" accounts, namely, those used to induce a dealer handling 
competitive products to "switch" to a respondent. The amended complaints were broad-
ened to include new and retained accounts and only when the practices in question were 
used to induce exclusive dealing. The Initial Decision ordered dismissal of the com-
plaint. On appeal, the Commission remanded the cases to the Hearing Examiner with a 
direction to receive further evidence. See note 73 infra. 
72 In Shell Oil the Commission's decision upholding the Hearing Examiner's dismissal 
of the complaint deleted the finding that nothing in the contract prohibited the car 
dealers from buying from competitors and substituted the following: "Even so, the agree-
ments, many of which are 90% requirement contracts, on their face indicate the possibility 
of a restriction of the market. There is, however, no direct evidence in this record to 
establish the probability of the required competitive injury." 
73 Among the factors considered and the facts found by the Hearing Examiners were 
these: there was no foreclosure of competitors from selling to car dealer customers; 
competitors did not suffer loss of business as a result of the alleged practices; certain 
competitors who lost accounts to respondent also took accounts from respondent; after 
the peak year 1955 there was a decline in new car sales and car dealers; certain competitors 
showed an increase in business in recent years; the size and financial resources of respond-
ent do not in themselves justify inferences of illegality. In Socony Mobil, Hearing Exam-
iner Piper additionally stressed that counsel in support of the complaint appeared to 
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ceeding a Rule of Reason similar to that applied by the Commis-
sion under section 3 in Maico which, at that time, gave the Com-
mission an escape hatch from the constricted Standard Stations 
test of violation applied to section 3. Tampa Electric, as our pre-
vious analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in that case shows, 
should restore the Maico approach in the Commission's adjudica-
tions under section 3. So far as section 5 is used to challenge prac-
tices corresponding to but technically beyond those comprehended 
under section 3, Shell and Socony tend to foster harmonization of 
those sections in a manner that holds greater promise than adher-
ence to narrow interpretation of the Standard Stations rationale 
in section 3 cases. 74 
contend that competing successfully is an unfair method of competition. "Such a conten-
tion," the Hearing Examiner observed, "is, of course, the antithesis of the Sherman 
Act .•• .'' He also rejected the contention that lessening of competition in the Clayton 
Act sense can be proved merely by showing that the market shares of some competitors 
have been reduced. He relied heavily upon ITC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 
(1923), which he said was stronger on its facts than Socony, in concluding there was no 
violation of § 5. 
In the Ice Cream cases, Hearing Examiner Lewis, in a lengthy opinion meticulously 
reviewing the evidence and analyzing the applicable law, qualitatively evaluated the com-
petitive effects of the practices. He did not find it necessary to determine whether there 
is any valid distinction between the scope of inquiry under the injury to competition test 
applicable to § !I and that applicable to § 5. He pointed out that counsel in support of the 
complaint had not presented the case "in the narrow frame of reference of the 'quantitative 
substantiality' test of a Section !I Clayton Act proceeding" but added that there was no rec-
ord basis for deciding the question of competitive injury "in terms of the somewhat me-
chanical quantitative substantiality test.'' At any rate he concluded that the record failed 
to establish that "there has been any substantial injury to competition by reason of" re-
spondents' practices. 
On March 24, 1961, the Commission remanded these Ice Cream cases to Hearing 
Examiner Lewis with a direction to receive "such further evidence as may be offered for 
the purpose of showing, for some reasonable time, the extent to which requirements 
contracts, 'trade agreements' or other exclusive dealing agreements have been used by the 
various respondents, their subsidiaries and affiliates in connection with, or ancillary to, 
the sale of ice cream and other frozen products, the identity and location of the customers 
with whom such arrangements have been negotiated, and the quantities and dollar 
volumes of the products which have been involved in the transactions." The Commission 
said that an informed disposition of the appeal requires an appraisal of all aspects of the 
competitive effects of the challenged practices. 
See also complaint in Swift &: Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 8304 (1961). 
74 In another class of cases the Commission has issued complaints with separate 
counts alleging violation of § 5 and § 3 of the Clayton Act. The suggested guides for 
these cases are summarized in the text of this article, infra. Illustrative are: Fuelgas 
Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6362 (1955) (consent settlement); Murray Space Shoe Corp., F.T.C. 
Dkt. 7476 (1959); Rayco Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7734 (1960) (consent settlement); J. R. 
Prentice, F.T.C. Dkt. 7450 (1960); Int'! Staple &: Machine Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 8083 (1960). 
See Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6962 (1960). Cf. Brown Shoe Co., F.T.C. 
Dkt. 7606 (1959). Cf. ITC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) and ITC v. 
Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), where the Commission's orders under § 5 were 
set aside and where the practices under the additional count charging violation of § 3 
of the Clayton Act were held not to be within the coverage of § 3. 
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D. Section 5 in Relation to Jurisdictional Deficiencies Under 
Amended Section 7 of Clayton Act and Combined 
Section 5-Section 7 Proceedings 
Complaints in another group of Commission proceedings 
combine in one75 or in several76 counts charges of violation of both 
71S Barbara Burt assisted me on this topic. 
Foremost Dairies, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6495 (1956) (see infra for later developments); 
Scott Paper Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6559 (1956) (see infra for later developments); National 
Dairy Products Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6651 (1956); The Borden Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6652 (1956); 
Beatrice Foods Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6653 (1956); National Tea Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7453 (1959); 
The Kroger Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7464 (1959); and Crane Co., F.T.C. Docket 7833 (1960). 
In Foremost Dairies, supra, the Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision ruled that § 7 
had been violated but also ruled that the Commission has no authority under § 5 to 
proceed against acquisitions alleged in the complaint as means of "the constant and 
systematic elimination of actual and potential competitors." Some of the acquisitions 
alleged were of unincorporated firms and included asset acquisitions prior to the amend-
ment of § 7 in 1950. The complaint did not allege any specific unlawful acts beyond the 
acquisitions. The Hearing Examiner's opinion relied heavily upon prior cases dealing 
with the Commission's power to order a divestiture under § 5, a remedy denied by the 
majority of the Supreme Court Gustices Stone and Brandeis dissenting) in FTC v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). Admittedly, as the Hearing Examiner properly stressed, 
the Commission's powers under § 5 are limited to those granted by the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. The Hearing Examiner's opinion in Foremost, however, does not deny 
that the Commission could enter an order under § 5 restricted to enjoining unfair methods 
or practices. But the question of the Commission's power as to remedies under § 5 is 
not necessarily the same as the question of the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction 
under § 5. At any rate, the Hearing Examiner's conclusion in Foremost appears to be 
in conflict with the earlier interlocutory ruling of the Commission in the same case. See 
note 50 supra and my caveats in the text of this paper supra, which recognize the 
still unresolved perple.xities in determining when the § 5 charge is improperly being used 
as a substitute for attacking acquisitions covered by § 7. Is § 5 being used to reach trans-
actions economically equivalent to acquisitions embraced in § 7 but where the technical 
deficiency under § 7 nevertheless does not bar resort to § 5 on the ground that § 7 and 
§ 5 may be construed in pari materia in harmony with congressional intention? 
In Scott Paper, supra, the Hearing Examiner dismissed the complaint. The Commis-
sion set aside the Initial Decision and found that the acquisitions violated § 7. The charges 
under § 5, however, were dismissed. The complaint had alleged that respondent's constant 
and continuous acquisitions of companies engaged in the paper and pulp manufacturing 
industry and their conversion to the manufacture of sanitary paper produced by Scott, 
the dominant maker of such products, violated § 5. These charges were held to lack 
adequate support in the record. It should be noted that nothing in the Commission's 
findings of fact and conclusions questions the Commission's authority to use § 5 to reach 
practices not technically within the scope of § 7. This further indicates the Commission 
still adheres to its interlocutory ruling in Foremost Dairies and to that extent the Hearing 
Examiner's Initial Decision on that issue seems in conflict with the Commission's position. 
An appeal to the Commission in Foremost may throw further light on this difference of 
view. Note also the view expressed by me supra in questioning the extension of the 
Gra?'d Union rationale regarding the scope of § 5 to practices either not economically 
equivalent to those covered by the Clayton Act or where filling a gap attributed to a juris-
dictional deficiency is contrary to congressional intention. 
76 Luria Brothers and Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6156 (1954); Union Bag and Paper Corp., 
F.T.C. D~t. 6391 (1956) [consent settlement order affirmed by Commission (1961)]; Frue-
hauf Trailer Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6608 (1956); Dresser Industries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7095 
(1958); National Lead Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7096 (1958); and Continental Baking Co., F.T.C. 
Dkt. 7880 (1960). 
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amended section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. In seven of fourteen such combined com-
plaints the lack of section 7 jurisdiction over either unincorporated 
firms77 or asset acquisitions prior to the 1950 amendment of section 
778 explains in part resort to section 5. 
In other combined section 5-section 7 complaints the use of 
section 5 appears to be based on respondent's commission of un-
lawful practices other than the challenged acquisitions. In half of 
the fourteen combined complaints there are allegations that such 
additional specific practices transgress section 5.79 Many of these 
additional practices, however, fall within the prohibitions of either 
the Robinson-Patman Act80 or sections 381 and 882 of the Clayton 
Act. Others seem to constitute charges of incipient or full-blown 
Sherman Act offenses.83 Finally, there are allegations of several 
types of unlawful practices which do not appear to be within any 
of the conventional wrongs covered by the Sherman or Clayton 
Acts.84 
In seven of the combined section 5-section 7 complaints the 
Commission has not alleged any specific unlawful acts in addition 
to the acquisitions.85 However, there are indications that the Com-
mission may be using the respondent's intent as a factor for bring-
ing the acquisitions within its section 5 jurisdiction. Allegations 
in these seven complaints range from "acquisition for the purpose 
77 See Foremost Dairies, Inc., National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice 
Foods Co., supra note 75; Dresser Industries, Inc., National Lead Co., supra note 76. 
78 Foremost Dairies, Inc., and The Kroger Co., supra note 75. 
70 See Luria Brothers and Co., Union Bag and Paper Corp., Fruehauf Trailer Co., 
Continental Baking Co., supra note 76; National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., 
Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 75. 
80 See National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice Foods Co., supra 
note 75, and Continental Baking Co., supra note 76. Cf. Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 
76. 
81 Cf. Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 76. 
82 Union Bag and Paper Corp., supra note 76. 
83 See especially Luria Brothers and Co. and Union Bag and Paper Corp., supra note 
76. Also see weaker allegations in Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 76; National Dairy 
Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 75, and Continental 
Baking Co., supra note 76. 
84 See especially National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., and Beatrice Foods 
Co., supra note 75 (making loans of equipment and non-interest-bearing loans of money, 
selling equipment below market value, providing free services and gifts of money, making 
large advertising expenditures and hiring key employees of acquired competitors). Also 
see Luria Brothers and Co. (monetary loans to induce exclusive dealing), Fruehauf Trailer 
Co. (granting special financing and lease terms and providing favorable prices and other 
terms to induce substantially e.xclusive dealing), and Continental Baking Co. (cash pay-
ments for preferred display space), supra note 76. 
sr; Foremost Dairies, Inc., Scott Paper Co., Dresser Industries, Inc., National Tea Co., 
The Kroger Co., Crane Co., supra note 75, and National Lead Co., supra note 76. 
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or with the effect of substantially lessening competition"86 through 
"systematic elimination of competitors by acquisition,"87 "a policy 
of expansion by acquisition,"88 and "constant and continuous ac-
quisition"89 to the general statement that "the acquisitions tend 
substantially to lessen competition."90 
There are factors or allegations supporting the Commission's 
use of a section 5 attack upon acquisitions in eleven of the fourteen 
combined-charge complaints. In three cases91 there existed both 
jurisdictional defects barring section 7 action against part of the 
acquisitions and also specific additional practices as plus factors for 
the section 5 charge. In four complaints92 there were no jurisdic-
tional defects as to any of the acquisitions but there were plus-
factor practices for section 5, while in another four93 there were 
no plus factors but there were acquisitions outside the Commis-
sion's section 7 jurisdiction. 
In three complaints94 where the only apparent basis for a sec-
tion 5 charge was the fact that the respondent had made a series of 
acquisitions, the Commission's use of section 5 seems unauthorized. 
Since these complaints do not indicate the existence of any plus-
factor practices or section 7 jurisdictional defects, the Commission 
appears to be treating section 5 as an alternative to section 7 for 
the condemnation of corporate acquisitions.95 This "alternative 
jurisdiction" approach is also reflected in the fact that in some of the 
combined-charge complaints the corporate acquisitions challenged 
under section 7 were also questioned along with the non-corporate 
acquisitions in the section 5 allegations.96 
75. 
86 Dresser Industries, Inc., and National Lead Co., supra note 76. 
87 Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 75. 
88 National Tea Co. and The Kroger Co., supra note 75. 
89 Scott Paper Co., supra note 75. 
90 Crane Co., supra note 75. 
91 National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co. and Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 
92 Luria Brothers and Co., Union Bag and Paper Corp., Fruehauf Trailer Co. and 
Continental Baking Co., supra note 76. See also recent complaint in Campbell Taggart 
Associated Bakeries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7938 (1960). 
93 Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 75, Dresser Industries, Inc., National Lead Co., 
supra note 76, and The Kroger Co., supra note 75. 
94 Scott Paper Co., National Tea Co. and Crane Co., supra note 75. 
95 See also Hearing Examiner Pack's indication in his Initial Decision dismissing the 
compla~nt in Scott Paper Co., supra note 75, January 13, 1960, that he could automatically 
determme whether or not there was a § 5 offense by determining whether § 7 had been 
violated. 
96 It should be noted that we are concerned here only with questions of jurisdiction. 
We do not explore the extent of the relief available to the Commission in litigated or 
co~sent set~ement orders _under § 5. as against amended § 7 or 11 of the Clayton Act. 
It 1s recogmzed that questions regarding the efficacy of § 5 would arise if the Commission 
should confine its complaint to an attack upon acquisitions of unincorporated firms with• 
' 
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E. Summary of Suggested Guides for Harmonizing Section 5 With 
the Clayton Act in Jurisdictional Deficiency and 
Combined Section 5 and Clayton Act Cases 
The following guides are suggested for the types of cases (a) 
where the Commission resorts solely to section 5 because of a juris-
dictional deficiency arising from an omission of a transaction or 
practice not ·within the coverage of a Clayton Act provision; and 
(b) where the Commission combines in one proceeding section 5 
and Clayton Act charges. We have previously suggested guides for 
section 5 cases covering only charges of conventional Sherman Act 
offenses07 and cases involving only charges of violation of offenses 
dearly ·within the coverage of the Clayton Act provisions.98 
First, the Commission should proceed against transactions or 
practices covered by the specific provisions of the Clayton Act only 
under the relevant provisions of that statute. In such cases, proof 
under the particular Clayton Act count should be governed by the 
statutory standards and tests of violation applicable to that count. 
Second, a section 5 count may be invoked when the transaction 
or practice is equivalent to that within the coverage of the Clayton 
Act but a jurisdictional deficiency bars resort to the Clayton Act. 
In such instances, the Commission should sustain the burden of 
proving violation in accordance with the statutory standards and 
tests of violation applicable to the particular Clayton Act provision 
to which the jurisdictional deficiency is pertinent.99 
out allegations of unlawful practices in addition thereto and should then order divestiture 
of the acquired stock or assets. Cf. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); 
FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). See further, note 75 supra. 
Compare the consent settlement orders in cases where the complaints charged only 
violation of amended § 7 and involving one key acquisition. International Paper Co., 
F.T.C. Dkt. 6676 (1957); Automatic Canteen Co. of America, F.T.C. Dkt. 6820 (1958); 
Diamond Crystal Salt Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7323 (1960). 
In considering enforcement aspects, it should be noted that Public Law 86-107, July 
23, 1959, giving automatic finality, subject to judicial review, to the Commission's orders 
to cease and desist under the Clayton Act as in the case of § 5 orders, negates one pre-
vious advantage of resorting to § 5. Howrey, supra note 2, at 184. But a retroactive 
interpretation of the 1959 amendment to Commission orders entered prior thereto was 
invalidated in Sperry Rand Corp. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,920 (D.C. Cir. 1961); 
Schick, Inc. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,921 (D.C. Cir. 1961); FTC v. Nash-Finch Co., 
1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,929 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See Simon, The Retroactivity of Amended Section 
11 of the Clayton Act, 1960 CCH ANTITRUsr LAw SYMPOSIUM 85 (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n). 
07 See "Section 5 Cases Involving Only Conventional Sherman Act Offenses," supra. 
08 See "Commission Cases Initiated in Complaints Solely Under Clayton Act," supra. 
oo We have previously noted in the text of this paper that to the extent the per se 
violation approach under 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act is at odds with 
national antitrust policy, congressional amendment is required. But compare my com-
ments on § 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and § 3 and and amended § 7 of the Clayton 
Act, supra. 
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Third, in all cases where the Commission combines in one 
complaint charges of violation of section 5 and any of the specific 
provisions of the Clayton Act, the Commission should use separate 
unredundant counts which identify with reasonable definiteness 
the particular statutory provision to which that count relates. 
Section 5 should not be used as a dragnet single count which fails 
to give the respondent adequate notice of the ground on which the 
Commission claims jurisdiction under section 5 as distinct from 
particular sections of the Clayton Act. 
Fourth, since the Commission is authorized to proceed under 
section 5 against consummated or incipient Sherman Act types of 
offenses, this raises no special problem if the section 5 count identi-
fies with reasonable definiteness the Sherman Act type charges and 
the Commission sustains its burden of proof according to Sherman 
Act substantive criteria and tests of violation. 
Fifth, in no case should the Commission use section 5 as a sub-
stitute for its jurisdiction over transactions and practices specifically 
covered by the Clayton Act. 
F. Prohibitions of Unlawful Conduct Distinguished From 
Affirmative Regulation of Lawful Conduct 
These suggested guides also make pertinent the point that the 
Commission has authority only to prohibit section 5 or Clayton Act 
offenses. It has no authority under section 5 or the Clayton Act 
affirmatively to regulate acts and practices not within the conduct 
prohibited by Congress in its respective or interlaced statutory 
expressions of national antitrust policy.100 In Sinclair Refining101 
the Supreme Court stated a guidepost that has been frequently 
quoted in later cases: 
"The powers of the Commission are limited by the stat-
utes. It has no general authority to compel competitors to a 
common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or 
to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the con-
flict for advantage called competition." 
100 This does not overlook the initial broad discretion of the Commission in the 
formulation and reach of its orders to cease and desist but the remedy must have a 
reasonable relation to prevention or correction of the unlawful practices found by the 
Commission to exist, else the courts will find an abuse of administrative discretion. See 
principles stated in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 
343 U.S. 470 (1952); FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959). Cf. statutory provisions for 
affirmative disclosure in Mandel Brothers, supra, and Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. 
Cir. 1950), where the majority of the court modified the Commission order by deleting 
paragraphs which included affirmative requirements beyond the negative function of the 
Commission in preventing false advertising. 
101 FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923). 
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Chief Justice Stone in Keppel102 emphasized in similar vein 
that the Federal Trade Commission Act "does not authorize regu-
lation which has no purpose other than that of relieving merchants 
from troublesome competition or of censoring the morals of busi-
ness men." 
There is thus a vast difference between the power vested in the 
Commission to enforce the prohibitions in the Sherman, Federal 
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts and its lack of power to 
prescribe and regulate lawful conduct.103 
In the Ice Cream cases, supra, counsel in support of the Com-
mission's complaints under section 5 suggested a distinction be-
tween "beneficial competition" as fair competition and "worthless 
competition" as unfair competition. Hearing Examiner Lewis 
characterized this as "a somewhat esoteric standard" and rejected 
it in these revealing words: 
"Much of counsel's arguments with regard to 'beneficial 
competition' suggests that it is the function of the Commission 
to select from among the broad spectrum of competitive prac-
tices, having varying degrees of desirability, those which it 
deems most wise and beneficient. This, however, misconceives 
the function of the Commission. It does not 'presume to run 
the economic railroad.' Its function is to prohibit practices 
demonstrated to be 'unfair,' not to prescribe 'fair' ones." 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
My suggestions to bring into harmony, where Congress has per-
mitted, the body of the three fundamental antitrust laws, undoubt-
edly leave ragged edges resulting from the imperfect congressional 
shears. My study persuades me that thus far the Commission has 
not shown a spirit of conquest beyond the bounds of its antitrust 
102FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304,313 (1934). 
103 Pertinent in this connection are the caveats expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, 
and by l\fr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935), regarding the limitations upon the authority committed 
to the Commission under § 5. 
Senator Cummins, a leading advocate of the Federal Trade Commission Act, said: 
" ••• if I thought that the commission which we hope to create would sit down and attempt 
to write out an instruction to the business men of this country as to the things they could 
lawfully do and the things which it would be unlawful for them to do, there is no power 
that could induce me to favor it." 51 CONG. REc. 12917 (1914). 
Another leading proponent, Senator Walsh, said in like tenor: "We are not going 
to give to the trade commission the general power to regulate and prescribe rules under 
which the business of this country shall in the future be conducted; we propose simply 
to give it the power to denounce as unlawful a particular practice that is pursued by that 
business." 51 CoNG. REc. 13317 (1914). 
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authority, although it may not be uniformly circumspect in resolv-
ing doubts against its jurisdiction. 
In the years ahead the Commission will have the continuing 
responsibility of balancing its legitimate claim to a flexible section 
5 antitrust coverage against a disciplined disclaimer of jurisdiction 
when such expansion of authority is spurious. The line between 
the two cannot be drawn with slide-rule certainty. Nevertheless the 
Commission initially, and ultimately the courts, cannot avoid the 
exercise of informed judgment in separating jurisdiction that is 
granted from jurisdiction that is arrogated. 
The congressional road map of directions and intended destina-
tions for harmonization of the major antitrust laws does not compel 
travel over one statutory road. It would be exaggerating the uncer-
tainties to read the congressional antitrust map as though agencies 
of antitrust enforcement can decide for themselves where to go and 
how to get there. 
A government agency like the Federal Trade Commission is not 
shackled with a policy of conservatism. Congress allowed for explo-
ration of new areas within the Commission's delegated authority. 
But Congress did not grant the Commission authority for sheer 
conquest. 
